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In the UK, participation in decision-making is increasingly being viewed as a right for users
of mental health services. Yet research repeatedly ﬁnds a policy implementation gap in
this area. Drawing on a localised, qualitative study involving three mental health service
user/community groups, this article frames this issue in terms of a ‘politics of recognition’.
It demonstrates how whilst government user involvement policies ofﬁcially attempt to
recognise users and their voices, they simultaneously reconstitute failures of recognition
in terms of status subordination and a disqualiﬁed identity for service users, thereby
obstructing participatory parity and amounting to a dereliction of the core principles
underlying human rights.
I n t roduct ion : the po l i cy contex t
The active participation of the public and service users in influencing and shaping
health, social care and other public sector services has been a cornerstone of social
policy in the UK since the 1980s. In the healthcare sector, this ‘user involvement’ has
been promoted across all levels of service interaction from individual service encounters
through to service management and strategic planning both locally and nationally (DoH,
2000, 2001a, 2005, 2006a and b, 2008; DHSSPS, 2004; SEHD, 2000, 2001, 2003a
and b). Nowhere has this policy imperative been more salient than within mental health
services (SO, 1997; DoH 1999, 2001b; DHSSPS, 2000; SEHD, 2006; CSIP/NIMHE, 2007)
where a democratisation agenda has been strongly pursued by organised groups of
service users/survivors1 (Campbell, 1999) and the voluntary sector has led the way in
terms of practice development. In mental health services, then, the structures, forums
and mechanisms that enable user involvement are numerous. They encompass NHS
statutory patient and public involvement structures, including new Local Involvement
Networks (LINks) in England, introduced as community-based forums designed to aid the
responsiveness of health and social care services to local needs (DoH, 2006a, 2007a)
and regional Health Councils in Scotland (SEHD, 2003c). They also encompass local
and national service user/survivor groups and networks (both independent and service-
led), service users participating in policy-making and implementation groups and local
or national user consultation exercises.
The aims of user involvement have been expressed in both consumerist terms of
enhanced responsiveness to needs and democratic ones of service user empowerment and
social justice. These aims do, however, remain a source of tension for user involvement
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since, whilst policies often conflate the two, it has been widely argued that meaningful
participation for service users cannot be achieved through a consumerist approach that
fails to engage with imbalances of power and divergences of interest between users
and providers of services (e.g. Forbes and Sashidharan, 1997; Florin and Dixon, 2004;
Stickley, 2006; Carr, 2007). Indeed, research across a range of sectors has repeatedly found
an implementation deficit for user involvement policies (Bochel et al., 2007). In mental
health services, this deficit appears to exist at both the individual level of treatment
and care (Webb et al., 2000; Rose, 2001; Connor and Wilson, 2006) and the level of
service planning and development (Wallcraft, 2003; Rutter et al., 2004; Hodge, 2005a;
Carr, 2007). Evidence therefore suggests that in this service context, the aims of user
involvement are still not fully realised in practice, and that, whilst there is some cultural
change, this remains unaccompanied by structural transformation to afford users more
decision-making power (Campbell, 2006). Furthermore, concurrent recent mental health
policy imperatives towards increased surveillance and control of service users, which have
included the introduction of newmental health legislation (SEHDMental Health Division,
2003; DoH, 2007b) that extends the compulsory powers of services outside of in-patient
treatment, appear incompatible with the development of user involvement, whether this
emphasises ‘choice’ through consumerism or ‘citizenship’ through the democratisation of
services (Pilgrim and Waldron, 1998; see also Carpenter, 2009 and Spandler and Calton,
2009, both in this volume).
Alongside user involvement, the government has recently promulgated a human
rights framework for healthcare (DoH, 2007c) which promotes the application of human
rights principles of dignity, equality, respect, fairness and autonomy as the value base
for service provision. The application of this value base in public sector services is also
being promoted through the work of the recently formed Equality and Human Rights
Commission. This highlights the question of what the above state of affairs with user
involvement in mental health services means for the achievement of a human rights-
based approach within these services. Indeed, effective user involvement is identified
by the DoH as central in this approach to the development of mental health policy and
services (ibid.; cf. Parker, 2007). This article draws on recognition theories and a qualitative
study of user involvement in mental health services conducted in one British locality in
order to explore this question. It aims to illuminate the social and cultural dynamics of
user involvement in mental health services and associated human rights concerns, and to
outline implications for policy development. Some theoretical background and then an
outline of the study are presented first.
Po l i t i cs o f recogn i t ion as a perspec t i ve on human r igh ts
Recognition theories are concerned with cultural or symbolic power and injustice, as
analytically distinguished from, but related to, socio-economic injustice and political
representation (Fraser, 1997, 2000, 2007; Lovell, 2007a). They are concerned with
injustices ‘rooted in patterns of representation, interpretation and communication’ (Fraser,
1997: 14) and in ‘cultural distinctions institutionalised in the status order’ (Lovell, 2007a:
4), with ‘discourses’ and the ideological realm. Thus, those in disadvantaged positions,
for example due to poverty (Lister, 2004) or a disabling society (Shakespeare, 2005), are
seen to suffer both socio-economic injustices of deprivation and cultural ones of withheld
recognition. Fraser (1997, 2000) identifies three dimensions to these recognition denials:
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non-recognition, the rendering of invisibility as a result of dominant cultural forms; mis-
recognition, being seen as lacking value and as inferior; and disrespect, being maligned or
disparaged in everyday interactions or representations. A politics of recognition therefore
aims towards seeing and valuing individuals, groups, identities, experiences, knowledges
and expertise, (potential) contributions, humanity and personhood; upholding citizenship
status and rights; and affording people dignity and respect (Fraser, 2000; Lister, 2004,
2007).
What is key here, then, is that the importance of recognition is not just socio-
political but also personal, with a strong moral dimension to the issue (Honneth, 1995).
Forms of non- or mis-recognition and disrespect can inflict harm and be personally
damaging, undermining people’s sense of selfhood and self-worth; they can be a form of
oppression (ibid.; Taylor, 1992; Lister, 2004; Lovell, 2007a). A politics of recognition is
thus concerned with both personal and social identities and the interaction between the
two, and with the intersubjective shaping of subjectivity, or sense of self (Honneth, 1995).
It is concerned with the personal value and meaning people give their own existence,
lives and experiences. Non-recognition, it is asserted, can leave people with a diminished
sense of self and mode of being, and mis-recognition and disrespect with a distorted one
as they come to internalise the cultural or symbolic injustices of dominant understandings
and values (Taylor, 1992). Struggles for social recognition are thus also struggles for self-
esteem (feeling valued by one’s social groups and society as a whole), self-respect (a sense
of moral and legal personhood derived from the state) and ‘self confidence’ (emotional
ontological security) (Honneth, 1995).
These intersubjective processes are central to Bourdieu’s (1992) theory of symbolic
power and practice. In his ‘politics of recognition’, power operates through the ways in
which language and ideology come to construct social belief. This power of ‘constituting
the given’, he argues ‘can be exercised only if it is recognised, that is, misrecognised,
as arbitrary’ (Bourdieu, 1992: 170). Bourdieu terms the wielding of symbolic power
‘symbolic violence’, a form of domination and oppression which comes from constructing
reality in ways that privilege the knowledge and culture of the dominant group, and
through practices of social exclusion and inferiorisation. It operates through such
constructions and practices being internalised by subordinate groups, as people may
come to see their subordinate status as legitimate, through ‘internalised oppression’. It is
thus resisted through symbolic struggle to challenge the ideological basis of the social
order – through recognising and exposing forms of domination for what they are, and
asserting alternative meanings and values which afford dominated individuals and groups
a higher social status and worth.
Recognition theories are often associated with the politics of ‘new social movements’
(e.g. Bourdieu, 1992; Honneth, 1995; Fraser, 2000; Fraser and Honneth, 2003) and
discussed in relation to social policy, democracy and citizenship (e.g. Fraser, 1997, 2000;
Williams, 1999; Lister, 2004). In these contexts, recognition is sought, on the one hand, for
universal shared humanity for those who are socially marginalised or subordinated (Fraser,
2000), drawing on human rights principles such as the affording of respect and value to
persons (Lister, 2004). Honneth (1995: 119) argues ‘self-respect’ to be derived from a
‘sense of the possession of universal human rights’ such as equality (in moral and legal
terms). Accordingly, the recognition struggles of new social movements and service user
groups have often been around ‘personhood’, common humanity and citizenship, and the
related principle of equal moral worth (Fraser, 1999; Williams, 1999; Lister, 2007). On the
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other hand, recognition is also sought by some for cultural identity and experience and
concerned with the revaluation of and esteem for groups (Fraser, 2000; Honneth, 2003),
a recognition claim which can be related to the human rights principles of autonomy
(or self determination) and dignity (Honneth, 1995; Dean, 2008). Both types of claim –
universality and distinctiveness2 – are inter-dependent with civil and political rights and
social, cultural and economic rights. For instance, Fraser (2000) views the actualisation
of full societal participation for subordinated groups as predicated upon their cultural
revaluation – a claim which resonates with Cresswell’s (2009) assertion in this collection
that social and political rights are constituted by the assertion of ‘experiential rights’.
Similarly, Lister (2004) notes how socially derived respect and esteem are necessary for
the full realisation of participation in public affairs, as a political right of citizenship
(although she argues that the relationship here is in fact a dialectical one). Many theorists
thus discuss cultural recognition, along with imbricated socio-economic ‘redistribution’
and political representation, as essential to the realisation of participatory parity in the
public sphere (Honneth, 1995; Fraser, 1997, 2000, 2007; Fraser and Honneth, 2003;
Lister, 2004; Lovell, 2007a), although the nature and direction of these relationships
remain disputed.
In this light, this paper brings a range of recognition theories (cf. Lovell, 2007b), as a
perspective on human rights, to bear on the study of user involvement in mental health
services. Its focus is on the construction of identity and experience through the structures
and relations of these services and how this relates to participation and equality. The
article thereby addresses a gap in the substantive literature on user involvement in mental
health services as well as in the application of recognition theories, which has tended to
overlook the area of mental health, with more attention being paid to disability politics
(e.g. Lister, 2007).
The s tudy
The article draws on a localised, qualitative study of user involvement in mental health
services conducted in the north-east of Scotland. The aim of the study was to explore
the outcomes of user involvement policies for the participation of women and men
service users within mental health services and for the development of these services.
Various statutory and voluntary sector forums for user involvement had been established
in the locality, including user representation on statutory sector planning committees,
a user network attached to the psychiatric hospital, a user consultation exercise and a
reference group administered by the voluntary sector. There were also several community-
sector mental health groups established and run by users and ex-users of services.
The study itself involved three of these mental health service user/community groups,
sampled purposively according to their institutional affiliation and status: a statutory
sector service user group, a voluntary sector community group (members of which
included service practitioners and providers as well as users), and an independent mutual
support group. The main purpose of the first group was to disseminate information about
mental health services and activities in the locality and to feed users’ views back to
statutory service providers, whilst the second group took a stronger lobbying function
with respect to mental health policy and services, and the third was primarily a support
group but also made attempts to influence local mental health service provision at
times.
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The study was conducted from a feminist critical discourse analytic perspective
(Fairclough, 1992; Lazar, 2005), and so focussed on the constitution of power in and
through language and other forms of social interaction. It accommodated a two-fold
conception of discourse: as a way of understanding, or a set of ideas about a particular
phenomenon, produced through language and social interaction that works ideologically
in conjunction with other elements of social practice (Fairclough, 1992) (e.g. the discourse
of ‘mental illness’); and, since discourses are often associated with particular fields of
social action and combine in particular ways, becoming core to the operation of social
institutions, as ‘knowledges’ and the totality of interactions in a given field of social
interaction (Fairclough, 2001) (‘psychiatric discourse’, for example).
The study also adopted a feminist methodological approach of a collaborative and
‘interactive’ mode of engagement with the groups and participants, and an action-
orientation (Kelly et al., 1994) towards influencing policy and practice. Multiple research
methods were employed, including: participant observation at group meetings; interviews
and informal interactions with service users (female, n = 9; male, n = 16), practitioners
(n= 2) and providers/policy-makers (n= 3); and analysis of local and national government
policy documents. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and data was analysed
both thematically and discursively.3
User invo lvement as recogn i t ion po l i t i cs
With the onset of user involvement, service users had become legitimate participants in
the planning and development of mental health services in the locality. Officially, the
policy initiative was touted as a measure to ensure recognition of service users and their
(potential) contributions to service delivery, and the service users involved embodied the
‘active’ welfare subject thereby constituted (Williams, 1999), motivated by a desire to
help themselves and others. Indeed, with growing acceptance of their increasing role,
users’ ‘presence’ and ‘voice’ were changing the cultural landscape of mental health
services in the locale, and there were personal gains for service users, described mainly
in terms of mutual support and opportunities for expression. However, the policy initiative
simultaneously produced various failures of recognition, which in turn served to structure
the social and political field of user involvement in mental health services in the study
area. In achieving ‘representation’ for service users, then, user involvement had opened
spaces within which recognition politics were played out (Fraser, 2007). In what follows,
I discuss these politics along two themes: non-recognition and disrespect: being a ‘user’;
and misrecognition: the discourse of mental illness and issues of authority and credibility.
These themes are related in the discussion to intertwined dimensions of redistributive and
representative justice (Fraser, 2007).
Non- r ecogn i t i on and d i s r espec t : be i ng a ‘use r ’
An intriguing finding of the study was how the policy discourse of user involvement itself
had disempowering and derogatory effects, and as such was itself very much contested
by service users in the locality. This was partly due to the ‘involvement’ element of the
discourse working to delimit the degree of participation and influence afforded service
users. However, invisibility for ‘users’4 was encouraged by the policy discourse of user
involvement itself, and its associated practices, being centred around people being users
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of mental health services and categorising people according to their ‘type of mental
health problem’ (see Lewis, 2005; cf. Hui and Stickley, 2007). In the face of this, the
mutual support group strove to operate outside of both the ‘service user’ construct and
the illness schema and conceptions of psychiatric discourse. And for the community
group, such concerns eventually led to the ‘affiliation’ column being deleted from the
signing in form for meetings. Yet the fact that group members struggled in vain to find
a satisfactory alternative term to that of service user revealed the narrow discursive and
semiotic parameters within which they were operating. As the following participant
notes, this meant that the practices of ‘user involvement’ inevitably had reductionist,
homogenising and pathologising effects through positioning people primarily in terms of
their relationship to services (Beresford, 2000) and their concomitant ‘mental illness’:
Even in places like the [named group], people who go along to that, you go along as a service
user, and even though it’s not meant, with the best will in the world people see you as a
service user, because you wouldn’t be there unless you had a mental illness. So even though
they’re trying to combat that, in a sense, what they’re still seeing first is the mental illness . . . [as
opposed to] the women or the man or whatever; you know it seems to take centre stage. (Carol,
46–55 years)5
So as this participant observes, in the context of user involvement people became
occluded from view by their ‘mental illness’ ascription and status as a ‘welfare seeking be-
ing’ (Hoggett, 2000). She notes how, in the field of mental health services, ‘service user’ as
a discursive positioning constituted people in such a way as their ‘mental illness’ came to
define them, along with the impossibility within the institutional confines of mental health
services of eschewing culturally prescribed identities or of ideologically deinvesting these
(Fairclough, 1992). The discourse and practices of user involvement consequently had
their own marginalising and dominating effects through social practices of objectification
(Foucault, 1982) which differentially marked ‘users’ from others in a hierarchical relation
(Williams, 1999), and dividing practices (Foucault, 1982) in which some were deemed
mentally ill and others were not – practices which support rather than help counter social
exclusionwhilst upholding the power and interests of psychiatry. These effects cannot help
but be reconstituted in the course of user involvement, and, if internalised, can lead to self-
alienation and oppression (Hoggett, 2000) – effects against which the above participant
is clearly struggling (cf. Hodge, 2005b). Furthermore, this identity construction resulted
not only in status subordination as people became constituted as less than full members
of society (Fraser, 2003), but also a kind of dehumanisation through an intersubjective
process in which people became denied ‘wholeness’ (as Cresswell, puts in his contribution
to this volume) and thus full humanity. As such, ‘service users’ were prevented from
participating in the (semi-)public arenas of user involvement as full-fledged partners on
the grounds of both inequality of social standing (Fraser, 2003) and unequal endowment
with the moral rights of ‘the person’ (Honneth, 1995).
These findings demonstrate how official movements towards valuing people and even
attempts at universalist recognition can ‘set inmotion a second – stigmatising – recognition
dynamic’ (Fraser, 1997: 25).6 The above participant’s reflections reveal the way in which
‘user group’ politics in healthcare have often centred upon ‘claims for the realisation
of personhood, for cultural respect, autonomy and dignity’ (Williams, 1999: 673). Yet
the very political alignments of user groups themselves work to simplify and reify group
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identities (Fraser, 2000), which ‘act back upon their incumbents’ (Taylor, 1998: 341) and
to forestall mutual recognition (Crossley, 2004) and parity of participation (Fraser, 2003).
In the context of mental health services, these effects are magnified by the stigmatising and
all-defining nature of a ‘mental illness’ identity which it is impossible to positively assert
(Hodge, 2005b; cf. Lister, 2004). Thus, through encouraging segregation and chauvinism,
these dividing practices and resulting reification of ‘mental illness’ identities not only
‘risk sanctioning violations of human rights’ through constructing people as less than
human, but also ‘freezing the very antagonisms . . . [they] purport tomediate’ (Fraser, 2000:
108).
The ‘stigma’ associated with having a ‘mental health problem’ and with being a user
of mental health services was consequently a ubiquitous concern for many participants,
often requiring forms of identity management since, as one interviewee pointed out,
‘nobody wants to be called a user’. Furthermore, many participants commented on the
ideological and political effects of the ‘user’ construct itself. One female respondent
commented, ‘most genuine people don’t use, they contribute’, thereby indicating the
ways in which the discourse constructed ‘users’ as deficient in certain respects (i.e. as
failing to contribute) and therefore how it could work to undermine the value and efforts of
individuals who became positioned as of unequal moral worth (cf. Fraser, 1997). Another
male interviewee pointed out its implication in constituting relations of dependency as
‘a “service user”: it implies that you’re addicted to them’.7 Consequently, this participant
refused the ‘user’ construction through adopting a purportedly more ‘respectable’ ‘patient’
one. Others resisted it through using variations such as ‘the user of the service’ or else
moved away from user involvement circles in order to dissociate themselves from mental
health services or to adopt a more politicised ‘survivor’ identity.
These findings illustrate again how welfare identity categories and official policies
aimed at recognition can have unintended consequences through which they produce
their own injustices of recognition. They also illustrate how these identity categories
have become a focus for resistance within the organising of many disability, service
user and survivor groups, underpinned by demands for respect, autonomy and dignity
(Williams, 1999). In the absence of a more fully developed and consensual social
rights perspective in respect of welfare provision, the above participants were aware
of how ‘users’ inevitably became ‘construed as inadequate, blameworthy or undeserving’
(Hoggett, 2000: 193), and that the construction of dependence was a means through
which power was exercised (ibid.) and which was corrosive of citizenship rights (Lister,
2007). Moreover, these injustices of recognition could be highly personally damaging
and distorting, reflecting back to people a ‘confining . . . demeaning . . . and contemptible
picture of themselves’ (Taylor, 1992: 25), robbing people of ‘every opportunity to
attribute social value to their own abilities’, and depriving them of self-esteem and
self-realisation (Honneth, 1995: 134). Again, it was an awareness of this and the
indignation, hurt and anger this produced which informed participants struggles against
such recognition denials and the importance they attached to such struggles (Honneth,
1995).
The discourse and practices of user involvement thus had competing and
contradictory effects, since they simultaneously worked to dominate, segregate and
inferiorise ‘users’ and to open up spaces in which such hierarchical social relations could
be contested and distinctions redrawn (Williams, 1999). As the following participant
points out, however, the powerful subjectifying effects of service users’ social positionings
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meant the balance of power was very much against them as they attempted to engage in
such action:
For a lot of us it’s been a hard struggle and a fight; we don’t even believe in our own worth, to
then start saying, ‘hey, I can probably teach other people things’, whatever it is, you know, total
reversal of role, ‘oh yeah I’ve got something to offer the world, I’m far from being a nobody,
a nothing, a worthless waster’ . . .because society has put them in the position and they are
unfortunately [pauses] wasting. I mean I’m saying that in the positive sense, you know, they are
wasting, they could be doing a hell of a lot. (Mark, 46–55 years)
This participant clearly describes the reflexive constitution of personal and social
identities (Fairclough, 1992), or rather of ‘non-identities’ (being a ‘nobody’) for service
users. The extract provides an example of the way in which social movements have
challenged the denial of basic human rights on the grounds of how withheld recognition
denies self-respect and self-esteem, which is dependent not only on being valued by
one’s social groups, but also on experiencing oneself as ‘valuable for society’ (Honneth,
1995: 20). It illustrates well the injustice of misrecognition and internalised oppression
(Bourdieu, 1992) for mental health service users who become constituted as dependent
and helpless. It also illustrates how political action among mental health service users
has, like that of feminism, been ‘a struggle for cultural agency’ (Lister, 2007: 160) and
how forms of misrecognition can be both a social barrier and a motivating force for
subordinated groups (Honneth, 1995: 120). Importantly in this context, the participant
points out as well how, in being constructed by social institutions, the dependency and
helplessness of many mental health service users is at least in part ‘surplus’ and potentially
remediable (Fraser and Gordon, 1994; cf. Williams, 1999). The quote thus also indicates
the inter-dependency between social structural change and the realisation of citizenship
rights, on the one hand, and the cultural realisation of the principle of equal moral worth
and the achievement of symbolic justice on the other (Fraser, 2000, 2007; Lister, 2004).
The ways in which these issues of status and self-esteem impacted on the achievement
of participatory parity in user involvement fora (cf. Fraser, 2000, 2003; Lister, 2004) were
evidenced by the research. At the first level, many participants, especially the women
and a young male service user interviewed, described problems of ‘confidence’ about
participating in group meetings, and especially in policy fora in which two women service
users described feeling ‘like a fish out of water’. Inequalities of class also impacted here;
there was an over-representation of those from higher social classes in the groups, and
especially among those holding ‘user representative positions’, and whilst some group
participants were of working-class locations, it was clear that this disadvantaged their
participation in respects. For example, at one policy meeting at which I was present, a
round of introductions reached a male service user of an apparently working-class social
location at which point rather than in introducing himself, he remarked awkwardly, ‘I’m
not really sure if I should be here’ and went on to remain silent for the course of the
meeting.
At a second level, there was the ubiquitous issue of the status of user groups in the field
of mental health services and in wider society (cf. Honneth, 1995). On occasions when
male psychiatrists addressed meetings of the groups, they tended to be allocated ‘prime
time’ slots after which they departed, and there were times when user group members
displayed deference towards service providers (who, for example, became thanked for
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their ten-minute attendance at a meeting). The following quotation demonstrates the
pain and anger that injuries of status inequality, inferiorisation and misrecognition could
invoke (cf. Honneth, 1995, 2003; Wilkinson, 2005), as well as Fraser’s (2007: 20) point,
that ‘people can . . . be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalised
hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing’:
You’re classed as some sort of under-dog, that’s for sure (. . .) you only have to mention ‘user
groups’ and ‘network groups’ and ‘empowerment groups’ and anything voluntary. If you haven’t
got a paid job, haven’t got a title, then you’re the under-dog. No matter how much you say
you’ve got empowerment, you don’t have it. (Maureen, 46–55 years)
This quotation illustrates once more how user involvement, as a policy initiative,
could have unintended consequences of reinforcing a low social status for participants,
since although user groups can afford those previously unrecognised some value, and
create social worth and meaning for members, the social and self-esteem to be derived
from this is counterweighted by subordination for such groups in the wider social and
cultural order (Honneth, 1995). Through its participation in this order, and its being
inescapably framed by dominant ‘systems of signification and representation’ (Lister,
2007: 161), which positioned participants as ‘comparatively unworthy of respect or
esteem’ (Fraser, 2000: 114), user involvement thus simultaneously worked to reconstitute
and reinforce an inferior, devalued and marginalised position for ‘mental health service
users’ (ibid.; Lister, 2007; cf. Williams, 1999). From this perspective, user involvement was
reproducing – and also masking – the violation of justice it was officially aiming to redress:
status inequality between service users and other social actors in themental health system.
Moreover, this research evidenced how there could be practices of subjugation within
the activities of user involvement themselves. According with other research (e.g. Rutter
et al., 2004), the accounts of statutory sector service providers tended to infantalise and
patronise service users, constructing them in dialectical opposition to their own more
‘mature’ and ‘reasonable’ stance. For example, onemade repeated reference to the need to
involve ‘appropriate individuals’ who were ‘able to work collaboratively’, criticising both
implicitly and explicitly the ‘behaviour’ of others who failed to take such an approach.
Another referred to service users getting ‘too involved’ and finding it ‘difficult’ to adhere to
the timeframe of meetings because ‘they can only speak for so long’. Unsurprisingly, such
subordinating constructions were often experienced as disparagement by service users,
especially the men and those with professional backgrounds, one of whom commented:
Really, you have to burrow your way in and, if necessary, put up with all kinds of people you
don’t like, and go along with practices you don’t like, and swallow quite a lot of insults as well.
The earliest phase, when we first set up the 50/50 partnership was that anything we put down
on paper should be in simple language that the users could understand – because we’re all
supposed to be stupid, you know. (Steve, 36–45 years)
This extract highlights yet again the competing and contradictory effects of practices
in the area of user involvement, which could be aimed at affording people value through
inclusiveness, but result in being ‘insulting’ to some. It illustrates an ‘evaluative form of
disrespect’ or degradation in the sense of diminished social esteem or status, and how
such attributions can be injurious to self-esteem, how experiences of social denigration or
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humiliation endanger the identity of human beings (Honneth, 1995: 134–5). It also
demonstrates again how emotional responses from experiences of being disrespected
and humiliated – indignation, anger, hurt – can provide the moral imperative and
motivation for struggles for recognition (ibid; Honneth, 2003). Furthermore, whilst being
particularly ironic and damaging in the context of mental health services, such necessary
reactions to ‘psychological and emotional wounds’ themselves create their own wounds
(Lister, 2007). Evidently, such situations left service professionals with a difficult balance
to achieve, something also experienced by myself as I went about preparing and
disseminating the research briefing paper for the study. This was particularly so as such
discussions of ‘appropriate language’ and so forth for service users, referred to by the
above participant, themselves work to constitute inequality due, as he notes, to the
assumptions that underpin these.
The social–structural underpinnings of many of the claims of withheld recognition
described above (Fraser, 2000) were thus omni-present and served to frame the
interactions of the field. Participants’ accounts were informed by an awareness of how
they were socially positioned as mental health service users, and the intersections of this
with their gender and class locations. Consequently, for those men ‘not used to being
subservient’, as one put it, the recognition order and status hierarchy (Honneth, 2003)
of mental health services in which psychiatrists were at the top and service users at the
bottom was experienced as especially unjust and degrading. Many therefore engaged in
forms of subversion and resistance to institutionalised relations and practices of social
subordination (Fraser, 2000) whilst participating in user involvement activities. One
participant, for instance, described how he ‘dressed up’ for meetings (‘a radical approach
with a clean shirt on’), a kind of presentation of self (Goffman, 1959) viewed as a means
of symbolically challenging the status service users were prescribed. Moreover, through
their accounts in the research and other discursive arenas, in the recognition of the
operation of power, and through seeking to expose and understand this, participants were
engaged in symbolic struggle – both personal and social (Bourdieu, 1992). Theirs was
a struggle for recognition of power operating within ostensibly benign, helping relations
and institutions and of the effects of this for the service users involved, a form of political
resistance dependent on moral insight into injustice (Honneth, 1995) and of ‘imaginative
agency’ (Hoggett, 2000) which afforded self-respect and self-esteem (Honneth, 1995). As I
now discuss, these recognition struggles inevitably included battles against the constitutive
work of the discourse of mental illness.
Mis r ecogn i t i on : t he d i scou r se o f men ta l i l l ness and i s sues o f au tho r i t y and c red ib i l i t y
Whilst user involvement has (ostensibly) been established as an attempt to value
users’ views and contributions, and there was limited expression and impression
from participants in this research of deriving some personal value from taking part,
their experiences were mainly described in terms of a sense of being devalued – or
misrecognised – in the course of its activities. Indeed, in accordance with other research
(e.g. Wallcraft, 2003; Connor and Wilson, 2006), there were complaints from service
users about not feeling ‘listened to’ at all levels of interaction with services. At that of
service planning and development, for example in the context of the treatment of a report
of a local user consultation exercise, participants often referred to the difficulty of being
‘taken seriously’. Evidently being used to such inferiorisation, for the women service
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users there was often a taken-for-grantedness about this, whilst, following the discussion
above, two of the men participants explained the phenomenon as being due to a lack of
institutional status and associated ‘credibility’, one pointing out that unlike that of many
service users, my work had the benefit of ‘academic respectability’. However, participants
also implicated in this context matters of social identity in terms of [psychiatric] ‘labelling’,
referring to the difficulty of asserting one’s views, insofar as expressions of dissatisfaction,
being upset, anger and so forth could become attributed to one’s ‘mental illness’:
There’s always, when you say something controversial, ‘oh well she’s not feeling very well at
the moment’ muttered under people’s breath. (Carol, 46–55 years)
I mean, you can just write off users’ views, you know, ‘here he is being paranoid; here he is
being depressed’, you know, you can and that’s it. (Chris, 36–45 years)
These extracts evidence the insidious workings of power within the field of user
involvement in mental health services, which worked through psychiatric constructions
not only undermining the authority and credibility of service users’ views, but also
individualising and pathologising these. Chiming with the discussions of Cresswell
(2009) and Spandler and Calton (2009) in this collection, they illustrate the centrality of
an ‘illness’ concept in producing these effects. However, they also indicate the gendered
nature of these as whilst both women’s and men’s criticisms could be put down to
‘depression’, the men’s concerns risked simply being written off as ‘mad’. Such devaluing
and discrediting, or ‘psychiatric disqualification’ (Lindow, 1991) can be understood as
a form of symbolic violence towards service users (Crossley, 2004) who were battling
for social recognition – of their views, their experiences, and indeed ultimately their
humanity. The compelling injustice of this misrecognition as these struggles became
turned back on the individual as a sign of their ‘mental illness’ or ‘madness’ was noted
by the following participant in the context of discussing a long-standing dispute over the
payment of his expenses for attending meetings:
I’m still the madman because I’m the one who’s kicking up all this bloody fuss over one pound
fifty. (Steve, 36–45 years)
This quotation illustrates well how distributive justice can be a form of recognition
(Honneth, 1995) and is often linked to social status (Fraser, 2000), along with the cultural
valuation of one’s efforts (Honneth, 2003). It demonstrates how the withholding of such
recognition can be experienced as a social injury and the emotional as well as political
and moral significance of struggles for recognition (ibid.) – for personal and social worth
and esteem, and for human dignity – in such economic confrontations (Honneth, 1995).
From a human rights perspective, it also poignantly illustrates how the normative principle
of being viewed as having ‘rational insight’ and a ‘reasonable moral agent’ (ibid.) which
underpins our understandings of humanity, and therefore moral and legal legitimacy
and the ascription of rights, is undermined when people are deemed ‘mad’ (Busfield,
2006; see also Spandler and Calton, 2009 this volume). Clearly, such undermining of
one’s personhood and humanity can work to have deleterious effects on interpersonal
and therefore self-respect (Honneth, 1995). The denial of social recognition for this
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participant implies his moral degeneracy (ibid.; Honneth, 2003) and, following Honneth,
his struggle is not only for economic redistributive justice and cultural revaluation,
along with associated social status, but also for universalist humanity and incumbent
interpersonal respect and self-respect.
This issue of moral responsibility being undermined by psychiatric discourse also
manifested in the research in the theme of ‘trust’ – both social and personal. The above
participant insisted in the context of his interactions with services that little would be
gained unless workers could ‘stop seeing people as sick people who can’t be trusted’.
Justice was for him, then, a matter not only of being afforded value, dignity and respect,
but also of being recognised as a responsible moral agent of full integrity and common
humanity (cf. Lister, 2007), of equal moral worth (Williams, 1999). Coinciding with
Cresswell’s (2009) discussion in this collection of the ‘split experiential whole’, the
particular importance of this was illustrated by another female participant’s account of the
de-authorising effects of mental illness constructions on subjectivity ‘to the point where
you can no longer trust your own judgement’. Being denied universal recognition, then,
being ‘misrecognised’, was to risk suffering not only ‘an injury to one’s identity’ but also
‘a distortion of one’s relation to one’s self’ (Fraser, 2000: 109).
The subversive workings of psychiatric discourse, which could work to undermine
service users’ authority to speak and to act, were thus displayed here. Furthermore,
the research illustrated the particular violence created when psychiatric discourse rubs
up against an understanding of user involvement as conditional upon the advanced
liberal ‘individualistic ethic of self-responsibility’ (Dean, 2008: 6). At one meeting, service
users became castigated by a senior male psychiatrist for failing to take ‘responsibility’
for their own problems, whilst their ‘dependency’ became construed as behavioural,
thereby serving to obscure the actual social construction of this dependency and struggles
against this (Williams, 1999; cf. Connor and Wilson, 2006). In this manner, the discourse
of psychiatry served to legitimate a denial of the right to participation. The extreme
injustice of this in the face of the New Labour policy mantra of interdependent ‘rights and
responsibilities’ of citizenship (Williams, 1999; Dean, 2008; Carpenter, 2009 this volume)
was particularly striking, since these areas of moral jurisdiction became mutually denied
to users of mental health services.
The symbolic injustice of ‘psychiatrising’ as a form of misrecognition in all of these
contexts was evident from, and indeed amplified by, its repressive effects. It worked to
silence service users, especially the women, in the public and semi-public arenas of user
involvement: one woman confided that it had led her to decide against raising an issue at a
meeting, whilst a male participant described how awareness of the matter among service
users meant he was one of the few prepared to speak out, even though the consequent
‘stress’ of this could have deleterious effects on his own mental health. It also tied to a
great deal of suppression of criticism in user involvement fora and in the formal research
interviews – something attributed by one woman participant to a ‘lack of self-esteem’.
Furthermore, among the women, this suppression sometimes encompassed self-blame for
problems experienced in interactions with services, and this seemed exacerbated by the
effects of psychiatric discourse in personalising socially generated phenomena.
There were a variety of tactics through which people engaged in symbolic struggle
in order to find an authoritative voice. These included discursive strategies such as the
disciplining of language use so that qualifying or down-playing arguments were also at
times a form of resistance and means of attempting to forge credibility, especially among
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the women, with the men tending to be more direct in their speech. There was also
the male counter discourse of ‘madness’, used at times by the men to reclaim the de-
authorising effects of a stigmatised identity and to pre-empt disqualification of their views.
In addition, silence and refusal to participate in user involvement activities, and in the
research, could have been understood in some cases as resistance, a refusal to subjectify
oneself to dominant institutions, discourses and relations. Overall, however, the research
evidenced how, rather than being challenged, the dominant cultural framework of psy-
chiatry and its ideological and political effects became reproduced as well as reinforced
in the context of user involvement, the discursive constraints of which left only limited
space for subversion and resistance (cf. Hodge, 2005a; Stickley, 2006). Along with forms
of non-recognition and disrespect, misrecognition as a result of the dominating effects of
psychiatric discourse, and the discourse of mental illness in particular, thus also served to
impede parity of participation in mental health service planning and policy-making fora
for service users (cf. Hodge, 2005b) and thus to deny them full access in practice to their
right to participation in this context (Honneth, 1995; Fraser, 2000, 2003; Lister, 2004).
Conc lus ion
In achieving representation for service users in the planning and development of mental
health services, user involvement has ‘furnished the stage’ uponwhich recognition politics
for service users is enacted (Fraser, 2007). Officially, the policy aims to afford value
and worth to service users and their views and to help democratise service relations.
However, this study demonstrated how, whilst the former of these aims has been partially
achieved, recognition for service users is forestalled by the discourse and practices of user
involvement, as tied to the discourse of mental illness and other elements of the wider
discourse of psychiatry. Indeed, it simultaneously reconstitutes failures of recognition
which act to structure the social and political field of user involvement in mental health
services (Lovell, 2007a) in order to deny service users an equal voice (Lister, 2007).
Consequently, user involvement fails to achieve participatory parity for service users, to
achieve fair political representation for this group, and as such constitutes an unjust social
arrangement (Fraser, 2003, 2007).
This research identified a two-dimensional failure of recognition for service users,
which at the same time became the focus of symbolic struggle: status subordination
(Fraser, 2000) and psychiatric disqualification (Lindow, 1991; Crossley, 2004). It also
demonstrated how the social and cultural conflicts of the field over matters of identity and
status (which also linked to socio-economic distribution) encompassed moral concerns
for ‘the person’ (cf. Honneth, 1995, 2003). Indeed, service users’ struggles were often
underpinned by the principles of equal moral worth (Williams, 1999) and common
humanity, and so were ultimately struggles for human rights. Yet as Orme (2002: 801)
points out, ‘rights should not have to be asserted by those with the least power’. Moreover,
the research evidences the social dependence of access to rights in this context: the right to
public participation could not be fully realised in practice without the cultural revaluation
of service users’ experiences and social recognition of service users as equal partners in
interaction (Honneth, 1995; Fraser, 2000, 2003; Lister, 2004), without the actualisation
of ‘experiential rights’ (Cresswell, 2009 this volume). Equality of participation would
have in turn afforded people full humanity and allowed human rights principles of
equal autonomy and moral worth to be respected (Fraser, 2003). As such, the current
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social and cultural framework of user involvement in mental health services and the
incumbent systematic failure to recognise users’ views and experiences, discussed by
way of introduction and further evidenced by this study, amounts to a dereliction of the
core principles underlying human rights: dignity, equality, respect, fairness and autonomy
– principles which the government has proclaimed as the value base for healthcare (DoH,
2007c).
The research also showed how the cultural dynamics and social ordering of user
involvement in mental health services need to be understood in the context of the wider
cultural and social-structural inequalities which include gender and social class. Yet the
failure to achieve participatory parity for service users and associated rights violations are
above all institutional harms which require institutional remedies at the level of mental
health policy and services (Fraser, 2000). This study indicates that this institutional change
needs to be two-pronged to address matters of both status and identity, and both structural
and cultural in focus (Fraser, 1997).
Firstly, there is a need to challenge the current hierarchical relations which
characterise mental health services and to work towards recognition of the status of
service users as full partners in social interaction (Fraser, 2000, 2001; Lister, 2004). This
will require a replacement of ‘user involvement’ policies and practices with those that
explicitly address institutionalised power and inequality within mental health services at
all levels of users’ interactions with these (cf. Stickley, 2006). A core aim here should be
changing ‘institutionalized patterns of cultural value’ which impede equal participation
(Fraser, 2003: 218), and this can be facilitated by and through recognising, including
through economic reward (Honneth, 1995), the informative and educational capacities
and function of service user/survivor groups and organisations for policy and practice.
Secondly, and related to this since different valuations are underpinned by discourses
(Fairclough, 1992; Lister, 2007), there is a need to rebalance mental health policy
and services away from individualised and medicalised understandings of distress
and associated responses, and towards a social model and community development
approach built on humanistic principles and centred around people’s social locations and
associated life experiences (Newnes and Holmes, 1999; Coppock and Hopton, 2000;
Tew, 2005). This would help destabilise ‘mental illness’ dichotomies and counter the
dominating effects of psychiatric discourse which currently comes largely from the taken-
for-grantedness of its schemas (Bourdieu, 1992). It would ensure people seeking help
to overcome distress were afforded both social recognition (full societal membership)
and universalist recognition (full humanity) (Fraser, 1999, 2003), working to unburden
those so positioned of ‘excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness’ (Fraser, 2000:
115), of stigma. As a process of integration, for many it would be ‘self alienation partially
overcome’ (Hoggett, 2000: 61).8
This psychological and political move will require cultural agency (Fraser, 1997;
Lister, 2007) and an expansion of discursive contestation (Fraser, 1997) within debates
about mental health policy and services, including on the part of service user groups,
to ensure we all start thinking in more social and politicised terms about distress (see
Lewis, 2009). It will also require a reframing of this political arena (Fraser, 2007) to
include not just mental health workers and a ‘subaltern counter public’ (Fraser, 1997)
of service users/survivors, but us all as citizens with an investment in mental health.
Currently, user involvement suffers a political injustice of misrepresentation not only
in terms of unequal participation for service users, but also misframing (Fraser, 2007)
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as ‘users’ become the containers for our fears about ‘mental illness’ (Hoggett, 2000).
Redressing this will require a national public engagement strategy for mental health
informed by a ‘politics of differentiated universalism’ (Lister, 1997) which recognises
common humanity, citizenship and equal worth as well as the social inequalities and
exclusions which frame people’s lives (Williams, 1999; Lister 2007). This government
strategy needs to encompass public concern through fora such as the new community
LINks (DoH, 2006a) alongside the actions of service user/survivor groups, women’s groups
and other constituencies, as connected with social political action in other fields (Lewis,
2009).
Taken together, these measures can help realise the currently unfulfilled recognition
aims of user involvement and concomitant human rights principles for healthcare (DoH,
2007c) in the context of mental health, and indeed help safeguard the human rights of us
all.
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Notes
1 These terms indicate differing identities, with the term ‘survivor’ used to denote survival of both
distress/illness and service usage, and ‘service user’ being less political.
2 In the mental health field, these two approaches have sometimes been described as ‘normalisation’
versus celebrating difference (‘madness’).
3 Ethical permissions were gained from Grampian Research Ethics Committee.
4 For stylistic reasons only, inverted comments are not always used when referring to ‘users’ or
‘service users’.
5 Participants have been given pseudonyms. Transcribing conventions: . . . indicates missing speech,
italics emphasis, and square brackets added text or text changed for anonymity.
6 Fraser discusses these ‘backlash injustices of recognition’ (29) in relation to policies of affirmative
economic redistribution. However, it is evident that policies such as user involvement, aimed at or
suggestive of redistributing ‘power’ and affording social and cultural recognition, can also have this
backlash effect.
7 Note here how particular types of discourse can come to be politically and ideologically invested
in certain ways depending on their usage in different institutional settings or social domains (Fairclough,
1992) since such (stigmatising) effects do not necessarily arise from being a ‘service user’ in other settings
(Rogers and Pilgrim, 1991).
8 On the relationship between challenging the dominance of bio-medical approaches to psychiatric
practice and upholding human rights, see also Spandler and Calton’s contribution to this collection.
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